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Abstract
We present a topological bicategorical syntax for the interaction between public and private information in
classical information theory. This allows high-level graphical deﬁnitions of encrypted communication and
secret sharing, including a characterization of their security properties, which are automatically satisﬁed
with no extra axioms required. This analysis shows that these protocols have an identical abstract form to
the quantum teleportation and dense coding procedures, giving a concrete mathematical analogy between
quantum and classical computing. Speciﬁc implementations of these protocols as nondeterministic classical
procedures are recovered by applying our formalism in a symmetric monoidal bicategory of matrices of
relations. http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This paper describes a bicategorical language for reasoning about cryptographic
processes in classical computation. Bicategories can be thought of as generalizations
of monoidal categories, mathematical structures which have already found
signiﬁcant application to quantum computation [1,12]. In this work, we describe
a monoidal bicategory 2Rel, and describe how its diﬀerent layers of structure can
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be used to describe public information, private information and nondeterministic
classical processes in a natural way.
Bicategories have a well-known sound and complete graphical calculus [6,11]
involving points, lines and regions, which we make use of almost exclusively for
presenting our formalism and proving our results. The reason is that the basic
axioms we impose have a direct topological interpretation which are cumbersome
from an algebraic perspective, but which the graphical calculus naturally absorbs
and makes trivial. Why this should be is far from clear; it provides evidence of a
deep relationship between topological structures and the theory of information [2]
which deserves to be explored further.
A diagram in our calculus can he interpreted as a history of computational
events, in which time ﬂows from bottom to top. To use the terminology of physics,
they are ‘spacetime diagrams’ for our computation. As an example of our notation,
the following diagram represents an encrypted communication protocol making use
of a one-time pad:
Alice Bob
D
E =
Alice Bob
(1)
A full description of the components of these diagrams must wait for Section 3,
but we can summarize the basic features here. The shaded regions represent public
information, and the vertices represent computational processes. Lines represent
computational systems which carry information: if the line borders a shaded region
then the associated system carries a copy of the associated public information, but
otherwise it carries private information. The dashed vertical lines, which are not a
part of the mathematical formalism, imply a separation of the components involved
between Alice and Bob which is convenient for our interpretation.
In the left-hand diagram, the bottom-left line indicates a system held by Alice
which stores some private information. This information is the plaintext that we
will encrypt. The bowl-shaped curve represents the ﬁrst nontrivial process—the
nondeterministic creation of a one time-pad—which is shared between the two
parties. The next vertex E represents encryption, a process which takes as input the
plaintext and a copy of the one-time pad, and produces public information. A copy
of that public information is then transferred to Bob, and is fed into the decryption
process D along with a copy of the one-time pad. The line emerging at the top-right
represents the decrypted plaintext. The result of this entire composite procedure
is given by the right-hand diagram: the original plaintext is simply transmitted
unaltered, and the public information is disconnected, meaning it is uncorrelated
with the plaintext. The equality between these two sides says that the encryption-
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decryption process is successful.
In this description, and throughout this paper, we freely interpret the underlying
mathematical structures in a way which is intended to make our formalism easier
to understand at an intuitive level. However, this interpretation it is secondary to
the basic mathematical content of our theory, which is crisp and unambiguous. The
motivating result is Theorem 4.6, which states that solutions to equation (1) in 2Rel
such that E never fails correspond exactly to implementations of classical encrypted
communication via a one-time pad, satisfying all necessary security properties.
The form of equation (1) corresponds exactly to the equation for quantum tele-
portation, as described in the bicategorical approach to quantum information [12].
One of the most important procedures in quantum theory, and yet uncovered only
relatively recently [3], quantum teleportation is a procedure whereby two parties
who share pre-existing quantum entanglement can transmit quantum information
between them, by communicating only classical information. A strong analogy to
classical encrypted communication can be drawn: two parties who share a pre-
agreed secret key can transmit secret information between them, by communicating
only public information. This analogy has already been recognized by several au-
thors [5,8], and our work provides a new formal mathematical basis for it.
The monoidal bicategory 2Rel which forms the basis for our constructions is
described in Section 2. In Section 3 we gives the details of our graphical formalism,
and Section 4 contains an application of our techniques to encrypted communication
and secret sharing procedures, including an analysis of their security properties.
2 The Bicategory of Matrices of Relations
2.1 Introduction
Bicategories, also known as weak 2-categories, are algebraic structures akin
to higher-dimensional directed graphs, and play an important role in modern
mathematics. They are built from vertices, edges going between vertices, and
surfaces going between edges, which are called 0-cells, 1-cells and 2-cells respectively.
They also carry algebraic structure, allowing edges to be composed along a common
vertex, and surfaces to be composed along a common edge. These composition
operations are required to be unital and associative in a suitable fashion. Though
elegant, the full deﬁnition is lengthy and we omit it here; see [4] for a good
introduction.
In this section we describe the bicategory 2Rel which will be the target for
our constructions. It can be presented quite simply in terms of ﬁnite sets and
partitions: 0-cells are ﬁnite sets, 1-cells are ﬁnite sets partitioned by their source
and target sets, and 2-cells are relations getting along with the partitioning. All the
structure of a bicategory can be deﬁned quite naturally on these structures. We give
a careful deﬁnition below, although for must purposes an intuitive understanding
of the structure is quite adequate.
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2.2 Construction
The n-cells of 2Rel are deﬁned in the following way. 0-cells are ﬁnite sets, denoted
S, T, . . .. A 1-cell A : S → T is a family of ﬁnite sets At,s indexed by s ∈ S and
t ∈ T . For 1-cells A,B : S → T , a 2-cell ρ : A ⇒ B is a family of relations
ρt,s : At,s → Bt,s indexed by s ∈ S and t ∈ T .
To demonstrate that these form a bicategory we ﬁrst observe that for each pair
of 0-cells S and T , the 1-cells S → T and the 2-cells between them form a category
in a straightforward way, under ordinary relational composition of 2-cells. Identity
1-cells idS : S → S are chosen as the family δs,s′ , which is deﬁned as the 1-element
set if s = s′ and the 0-element set otherwise. Horizontal composition is a family of
functors
◦ : Hom(S, T )×Hom(T, U) → Hom(S,U) (2)
for each ordered triple S, T, U of 0-cells. On 1-cells A : S → T and B : T → U , we
deﬁne this as
(B ◦A)u,s =
∐
t∈T
Bu,t ×At,s. (3)
This extends to 2-cells in a natural way.
The ﬁnal pieces of structure are the structural 2-cells of the bicategory. For each
family of composable 1-cells A : S → T , B : T → U and C : U → V we require an
invertible 2-cell
φA,B,C : (C ◦B) ◦A ⇒ C ◦ (B ◦A). (4)
Writing out the source and target using deﬁnition (3), we see that φ is built from a
family of isomorphisms
∐
t
(
(
∐
uCv,u×Bu,t)×At,s
) ∐u (Cv,u× (∐tBu,t×At,s)),
each of which can be constructed canonically. Unit 2-cells can be straightforwardly
deﬁned, and it is then straightforward to show that the required pentagon and
triangle equations commute.
In fact, 2Rel can be given the structure of a symmetric monoidal bicategory, for
which the tensor product of two 0-cells is their cartesian product as sets. For full
details see [10], in which an equivalent bicategoryMat(Rel) is described. According
to this structure, the monoidal unit 0-cell is the 1-element set.
Endomorphisms in 2Rel have the following property, which will useful later.
Lemma 2.1 In 2Rel, if 2-cells σ and τ are endomorphisms, then σ◦τ = id implies
τ ◦ σ = id.
Proof. Suppose at ﬁrst that σ and τ are relations on a ﬁnite set S. Then if
σ ◦ τ = idS , there must be at least one y ∈ S such that (x, y) ∈ σ and (y, x) ∈ τ .
But then there must be exactly one such y, otherwise we could not ensure that
x = z ∈ S implies  ∃y ∈ S with (x, y) ∈ σ and (y, x) ∈ τ . It follows that σ and τ
are graphs of mutually inverse bijections, and so in particular τ ◦σ = idS also. The
hypothesis follows immediately. 
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3 Private and Public Information
3.1 Private information
We assume that a single, isolated computational system is located at any moment
at a single point in space, so that over time its history traces out a line in spacetime.
In the absence of shaded regions, our diagrams are simple representations of such a
scenario, with vertices representing points at which multiple systems interact. This
part of our graphical formalism is the standard notation for morphisms in symmetric
monoidal category [9]. Our string diagrams are valued in Rel, the symmetric
monoidal category of ﬁnite sets and relations. This forms the endomorphisms of
the 1-element set considered as a 0-cell of 2Rel. In this way the ordinary string
diagram calculus for Rel embeds into our surface diagram calculus for 2Rel in
a natural fashion. We will interpret an object of Rel as representing a classical
computational system, with a particular ﬁnite set of internal states. Morphisms
are arbitrary nondeterministic computational dynamics, transforming states of the
domain into states of the codomain.
Using this formalism, we call a system self-dualizable if it can be equipped with
a unit morphism and a counit morphism
(5)
satisfying the following equations, called the snake equations:
= = (6)
The unit morphism represents a way to create two systems together, and the counit
morphism represents a way to eliminate two systems together. In essence, the
snake equations say that we can choose these structures in a way that represents
the topology of a string.
We say that the unit and counit morphisms witness the self-duality. InRel every
object A is self-dualizable, with the unit morphism η : 1 → A×A given canonically
by η =
⋃
a∈A
(•, (a, a)), and with the counit given by the converse of this relation.
Every unit and counit map is of this form, up to isomorphism. The unit morphism
η represents a nondeterministic processes whereby a pair of systems are prepared,
each in the same state a ∈ A, such that any pair (a, a) can arise in this way. We
can interpret this computationally as a one-time pad distribution procedure. It is
deeply interesting that this should arise solely from the requirements of the snake
equations (6).
For a set A there is a unique relation of type A → 1 which is total, meaning that
every element of A× 1 is in the relation. It can be characterized abstractly as the
unique morphism of this type with zero kernel [7], and is interpreted as eliminating
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the system A without halting the computation. It has a converse relation, which
represents the process of creating the system A in an arbitrary state. We denote
these morphisms graphically in the following way:
(7)
These are related by the unit and counit morphisms (5) witnessing self-dualizability
via the following equations:
= = = = (8)
Each of these has a natural interpretation in Rel terms of nondeterministic classical
computation: the ﬁrst set of equalities (8) say that if you nondeterministically create
shared keys and then delete one of the keys, the remaining key is uniformly random;
while the second set say that if you have a given key, it is always possible that
another key produced nondeterministically might match it.
3.2 Public information
Public information is represented in our formalism by regions. The intuitive idea is
that public information is stored by a family of systems, each strongly correlated
with their neighbours. Each individual system sweeps out a line through time, so
the family sweeps out an entire region:
 (9)
We shade this region in blue to indicate its special interpretation. The interpretation
as public information derives entirely from the fact that the information is now
available at many locations, each of which store an identical copy. So public
information is more accessible than private information, but as a consequence less
mutable, since to change its value every representative would have to be modiﬁed.
This mathematical model gives a reasonable abstraction for real-world public
data services, such as the Domain Name Service, which stores public information
redundantly on many independent computers.
As mentioned in the introduction, we are making use here of the standard
graphical calculus for monoidal bicategories. Shaded regions correspond to 0-cells
of the bicategory, and unshaded regions correspond to the monoidal unit 0-cell.
Manipulations of our public data are described by a small number of basic
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components. Copying and comparing public data are represented as follows:
(10)
In the ﬁrst of these one region splits into two, each carrying a copy of the original
public information. In the second two regions fuse to become one, which carries
the same information as the initial regions in the event that the data in both initial
regions is the same. Otherwise, the computation halts; in this sense, this second
vertex can be interpreted as the assertion that two data values compare successfully.
We can also represent deletion and uniform creation of public information:
(11)
In the ﬁrst of these, a single region is eliminated, deleting the information it stores.
In the second, a single region is created, which we interpret as holding any possible
value of the public information in a nondeterministic sense.
As with the bicategorical syntax for quantum information [12], in order to
support their interpretations, we require these copying, deleting, comparison and
uniform creation components to satisfy certain equations. They are topological,
in that they amount to saying that any composite diagram built from them is
determined only by its connectivity.
= = (12)
= = (13)
= = (14)
= (15)
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Each of these equations is consistent with the interpretation we give to the basic
components (10)–(11). For example, the ﬁrst equality labelled (12) asserts that
copying public information and then deleting the new copy results in the identity;
the ﬁrst equality labelled (14) represents the fact that exchanging public information
and then comparing gives the same result as simply comparing; and equation (15)
states that copying public information and then immediately comparing yields the
identity. In terms of higher category theory, equations (12)–(13) state that the
region boundaries are ambidextrous adjoints [6], and equations (14)–(15) state that
the associated Frobenius algebra is special and commutative.
The following theorem demonstrates that these structures are easy to work with
in 2Rel.
Theorem 3.1 Every 0-cell in 2Rel carries structures (10)–(11) satisfying equa-
tions (12)–(15) in an essentially unique way.
Proof sketch. A 1-cell A : 1 → S is determined by an S-indexed family of ﬁnite
sets As, and its isomorphism class is determined by the cardinalities of those sets.
Every such 1-cell has an ambidextrous adjoint, meaning precisely that essentially
unique values can be given for structures (10)–(11) that satisfy equations (12)–(13).
The result is a Frobenius algebra structure [6], which will be commutative exactly
when each of the ﬁnite sets As has cardinality 1, which satisﬁes the equations
labelled (14). The resulting structures automatically satisfy equation (15). 
3.3 Interacting private and public data
Interesting phenomena arise when we study interactions between public and private
information. There are three basic forms that such an interaction can take:
converting private data to public data; converting public data to private data; and
using public data to modify private data.
Conversion processes between public and private data take the following forms:
P S (16)
Here P is a publication process converting private data into public data, and S is
a sampling process converting public data into private data. Their interpretation
rests entirely on their types; there are no equations which we require them to satisfy.
These processes need not be deterministic, or invertible, in general. However, it will
later be convenient to require them to be kernel-free, meaning that they do not halt
on any input.
The ﬁnal type of process we introduce is the controlled computation, which
performs an operation on private data in a way which depends on the value of some
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public data:
C (17)
Such an operation can modify the private data, but not the public data.
Lemma 3.2 A controlled computation cannot modify public data.
Proof. We can use the topological behaviour of public information to rewrite our
controlled computation vertex C in the following way:
C = C (18)
In this form it is clear that the public data is not modiﬁed, since it is explicitly
copied before C is implemented. 
This result ﬁts well with our intuition about public data as a being carried by a large,
correlated family of systems. To change the value of the public data would require
modifying all of these systems, but the process C only has access to a restricted
subset, as made explicit by the open boundary on the left-hand side of the diagram.
If the proof given here seems too slick to have any real content, that is because this
is really a lemma about our interpretation of these mathematical structures, rather
than about those structures themselves.
4 Modelling Cryptographic Procedures
4.1 Encrypted communication
Suppose Alice is sending an encrypted message to Bob. We use a 2-cell E to
represent Alice’s encryption process, which relates the private plaintext P and the
private keyK to the public ciphertext C. Bob’s decryption process is a 2-cell D that
relates the public ciphertext and private key to the same ciphertext and a private
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plaintext. We represent these 2-cells graphically in the following way:
C C
P K
E
P
K
C
C
D (19)
While encryption and decryption are deterministic, key generation is not. We
represent key generation as a special 2-cell, the curried identity relation on the
set of keys K:
K K
This is the unit morphism for a self-duality on K, as described in Section 3.
Using our topological language, we can express correctness of encrypted
communication in the following way:
Alice Bob
D
E =
Alice Bob
(20)
This is the same 2-dimensional equation as that used in [12] to describe quantum
teleportation. The encryption step takes the place of the measurement operation,
and the decryption step takes the place of the controlled unitary correction. The
ciphertext takes the place of the classical bits transmitted from Alice to Bob. This
provides an intuition for why no faster-than-light communication is possible with
entangled particles: Alice and Bob merely share a quantum variant of a one-time
pad, and the actual encoded message must still be sent at some ﬁnite speed.
4.2 Security properties
Our formalism allows us to prove results about the protocol based on only its
abstract form, and hence draw conclusions which will apply for any implementation.
Many of these results can be naturally interpreted as describing security properties.
The generality of our results means that we can presume an attacker with arbitrary
computational abilities, as long as their actions are constrained to those that can
be described using our formalism (i.e. arbitrary nondeterministic processes.)
M. Stay, J. Vicary / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2013) 367–382376
To focus on its algebraic properties, we simplify equation (20) topologically in
the following way:
D
E = (21)
The ﬁrst property we will examine can be considered the primary security property
for encrypted communication:
E
= (22)
This says that if we encrypt a message using one copy of a one-time pad, and
then delete the other copy of the one-time pad, this is equivalent to deleting our
original message and producing a random ciphertext. So the ciphertext carries no
information about the plaintext in the absence of the private key.
We can use our formalism to derive from this security property a strong
constraint on the encryption operation E.
Theorem 4.1 If the encryption step in classical encrypted communication satisﬁes
property (22), then encryption is not invertible unless the space of messages is
trivial.
Proof. Suppose encryption is invertible. Then composing both sides of (22) with
E−1 gives the following graphical expression:
=
E−1
(23)
Hence the identity process on the set of messages factors through the one-element
set. 
This is a desirable property: if encryption were invertible, then both the plaintext
and the secret key would be derivable in principle from the ciphertext.
We can draw a very diﬀerent conclusion for the decryption process D.
Theorem 4.2 In classical encrypted communication, the decryption step is
invertible.
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Proof. From equation (21) representing correctness of encrypted communication,
we apply the topological properties of public information to obtain the following
equivalent equation:
D
E = (24)
This says that D has a right inverse given by E with its top-left and bottom-right
legs twisted in the manner indicated. However, by Theorem 2.1, if an endomorphism
is a left inverse then it must also be a right inverse, and hence our theorem follows,
with the following expression for D−1:
D−1 = E (25)

It follows that we can reconstruct E from the knowledge of D and its inverse.
Theorem 4.3 For an implementation of classical encrypted communication, we
have
E = D−1 (26)
Proof. We apply the topological properties of public information to expression (25)
to obtain the following:
D−1 = E (27)
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The right-hand side of this expression evaluates to E, by the topological
properties (12) of 2-dimensional regions and the snake equations (6). 
While property (22) is primary, there are other security properties of the
encryption process that we could consider. The ﬁrst states that if we encode with
a random key, this is equivalent to deleting the original message and producing
random ciphertext:
E
= (28)
Secondly, we could encode a random message with a speciﬁed key:
E
= (29)
This property says that this is the same as deleting the key, and producing a random
ciphertext.
We can also consider security properties for the decryption process.
D
= (30)
This says that if an attacker chooses nondeterministically from the space of all
possible keys, every possible message can be produced, regardless of the ciphertext.
So if an attacker has no knowledge of the key, they cannot extract information from
the ciphertext.
In fact, we can use our formalism to show that all of these security properties
follow from the primary security property (22).
Theorem 4.4 In classical encrypted communication, (22) implies (28–30).
Proof. The implication (22) ⇒ (28) follows from the topological property (8) of
the deletion map. For the other implications, we compose expression (25) for D−1
with the deletion map at the top-right leg, obtaining the following:
D−1 = E = = (31)
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Every invertible 2-cell in Rel is a family of bijections, and hence its converse
is its inverse. Taking the converse is a functorial operation, and so taking the
converse of of the ﬁrst and last diagram here, we obtain property (30). For the ﬁnal
property (29), we postcompose this expression with the 2-cell D−1, obtaining the
following expression:
=
D−1
(32)
We can use this to prove security property (29), where we also make use of
expression (26) giving E in terms of D−1:
E = D−1 = = (33)
This completes the proof. 
4.3 Main theorem
We now prove our main result, that our geometrical framework provides an exact
description of secure encrypted communication. First, we show that the security
properties come for free given a correct solution to the main equation.
Theorem 4.5 Every solution to (20) in 2Rel satisﬁes security properties (22,28–
30).
Proof. By Theorem 4.2 the decryption 2-cell D is invertible, and thus in 2Rel
corresponds to an indexed family of permutations. Such a 2-cell will always preserve
the deletion map, in the sense of equation (30). Adjoining a deletion map to (20),
we make the following graphical argument:⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
D
E
=
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⇒
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝ E =
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (34)
Hence we have established the ﬁrst security property (22), and the others follow
from Theorem 4.4. 
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Theorem 4.6 Solutions to (20) in 2Rel for which E is kernel-free correspond
exactly to secure implementations of classical possibilistic encrypted communication
by a one-time pad.
Proof sketch. The result is established by construction. From a description of a
space of messages, a family of one-time pads, and secure encryption and decryption
procedures, a solution to (20) can be directly constructed. By Theorem 4.5, the
converse is also possible.
Kernel-freeness of E corresponds exactly to the requirement that E must be able
to encrypt every plaintext with every key; it will never halt or fail on any input. 
We illustrate our proof sketch with the simplest nontrivial implementation of the
protocol: the encrypted communication of a single bit. We can describe concretely
the values of E, D and the key creation step η as 2-cells in 2Rel which correspond
to this scenario. We choose C = P = K to be the 2-element set, and we deﬁne the
2-cells as follows:
E =
((
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
))
D =
((
1 0
0 1
) (
0 1
1 0
))
η =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (35)
Here E is a matrix containing a single relation from a 4-element set to a 2-element
set, which is exactly the multiplication operation for the group Z2; D is matrix of
invertible single-bit operations to apply depending on which bit is published at the
encryption step; and η is a matrix with a single entry, the relation representing
nondeterministic creation of the pair of keys (0, 0) or (1, 1). Using the deﬁnition of
the bicategory 2Rel, it can be checked that these values satisfy equation (20).
4.4 Secret sharing
We can represent correctness of a secret sharing procedure in the following way:
E
D = (36)
On the left, we begin with some pre-existing public information. This is the
information to be communicated by the procedure. We prepare two correlated
systems using a one-time pad, and then manipulate the ﬁrst copy by a procedure D
that depends on the value of the classical data. The result is a pair of ciphertexts.
Both are then consumed together by a process E, producing public information.
This is successful when the result is to copy the original public information.
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The important security property of a secret sharing procedure is that if only
one ciphertext is available, then no information about the original message can
be regained. A strong, constructive way to phrase this is to say that if one of
the ciphertexts is erased, the other becomes uniformly random, and independent
of the original message. This gives two conditions, with the following graphical
representations:
D = D = (37)
Equation (36) has an identical structure to the quantum dense coding equation given
in [12], and the security properties (37) are equivalent to properties (30) and (32)
of the encrypted communication protocol.
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